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DALE T. MORTENSEN 
As the children of immigrants, my parents were raised in Scandinavian Minnesota. 
My mother, Verna Ecklund, was a university student for only one year but my 
father, Thomas Peter Mortensen, graduated from the School of Forestry at the 
University of Minnesota in 1936. They were married shortly after and moved to 
Enterprise, Oregon, where I was born in 1939. Enterprise, located in the far north-
eastern corner of the state, was in cattle ranching country surrounded by one of the 
most beautiful mountain ranges in the U.S. In these mountains, my father began 
his career as a lookout officer for the U.S. Forest Service. In the war years, they 
migrated further west to the Portland area where Dad help build Liberty ships in 
Mr. Kaiser’s ship yards and Mom provided day care for the children of Rosy the 
Riveter. After the war, the family, which now included my brother Arne born in 
1942, moved to the Hood River Valley 60 miles east of Portland where again my 
father returned to the practice of forestry. There my brothers and I, who included 
Irving born in 1947, were raised.
The valley of the Hood River runs north-south between the majestic   
volcanic peak of Mt. Hood and the stunning Columbia River Gorge. Nestled 
as it is in the beauty of the Cascade Mountains, it divides the wet western part 
of the state of Oregon from the dry highlands of the eastern two thirds. As 
such it contains all of the commercial forest species of the Northwest on the 
slopes of the mountains: the Douglas ﬁr, the hemlock, the true ﬁrs such as 
noble and white on the west and several pines, including white and yellow, 
on the eastern slopes. The valley itself is a garden of fruit trees that include 
bartlett, anjou, and bosc pears as well a variety of apples and cherries. Since 
I grew up there, the valley has also developed many vineyards and the town 
of Hood River on the Columbia has become a major destination for wind 
surfers.
My parents, as one of a few with any advanced education among the 
fruit growers and loggers of the valley, entertained the intellectuals of their 
community, their colleagues of like mind, the local school teachers, and a 
few eccentrics. I grew up listening to my father argue politics into the night 
and taking trips every Saturday to the Hood River library where my mother 
maintained her interest in reading and encouraged the same from her sons. 
This library was one of those small town institutions that beneﬁted from the 
largess of Andrew Carnegie, the founder of U.S. Steel and the great “robber 
baron” of Pittsburgh. In the days of my childhood in the 40s and 50s, long 
before the internet, it was these institutions and the occasional inspirational 
teacher that provided windows to the world of ideas to those living in the 
small towns and rural countryside of America. I beneﬁted greatly from having 
been exposed to excellent examples of both sources of enlightenment.
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I was a good student with mathematical ability and interests. As such, I 
took the usual college preparatory program in high school for one looking 
to become an engineer, all the available courses in mathematics and science. 
In my last two years of high school and all through college, I also used these 
skills in summers as an assistant to my father who managed the forest holding 
of a local timber company, a job that included assisting in surveying the com-
pany’s land, cruising its timber, and designing the roads used in the logging 
operations. I was also “well rounded” in the sense of that cliché in the 1950s. I 
had participated in boy scouts and 4H while in elementary school, had a bass 
baritone voice which I used in school and church choirs until 15 years ago, 
dabbled with acting and musical theater in both high school and college, and 
lettered three years as a member of the varsity football team of Wy’east High 
School, the new combined high school that served the valley students. I was 
even named all-league in my senior year high school, an achievement that I 
attribute to my cleverness more than my athletic ability.
In my last year at Wy’east, I became interested in American social history of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries and the related literature, much of which con-
cerned the industrialization of America. My grandfathers had been immigrants in 
the period; one had done reasonably well but the other lost his wife to tuberculosis 
in the twenties and his farm to the Depression of the thirties. From Sinclair Lewis, 
Hemingway, Faulkner and Upton Sinclair as well as the stories that my father’s 
friends told about their experiences, I expanded my knowledge of the human 
condition during this period. From the progressive historians of the early twentieth 
century, I formed my own picture of the industrialization that had transformed the 
country at that time and developed an understanding of how it had aěected the lives 
of my elders for both better and worse. By the end of my senior year in high school, 
I faced a dilemma… how could I combine my interest in analytical problem solving 
with a concern for social issues? 
A high school friend, Rusty Beaton, who had graduated the year before my last 
year, told me about his economics professor at Willamette University, Richard 
*LOOLVZKRKDGLQVSLUHGKLPLQKLV¿UVW\HDUDWXQLYHUVLW\%\FKDQFH,KDGDOVR
found at the Hood River Library The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the seminal text on what was to become game 
theory as well as a major application of mathematics to social analysis. I realized 
that economics was a possible way to combine my two principal interests. The next 
\HDU,HQUROOHGLQ:LOODPHWWHDVWKHEHQH¿FLDU\RIDIXOOWXLWLRQVFKRODUVKLSPDMRUHG
in economics and mathematics, and ended up as one of two of the senior assistants 
WR3URIHVVRU5LFKDUG*LOOLVLQP\VHQLRU\HDU$IWHUEHQH¿WLQJIURPWKHVROLGOLEHUDO
arts tradition of the oldest university west of the Mississippi, I went on to do gradu-
ate work at what was then the Carnegie Institute of Technology. In addition to the 
fact that I was offered a more generous fellowship than either Stanford or Harvard, 
it was an innovative program that emphasized an analytic as well as interdiscipli-
nary approach to the study of economics and management. I must admit, I was also 
attracted by the fact that it was located in Pittsburgh, which had played central role 
in the industrialization of America.
As it turned out, Pittsburgh was already on it way to becoming the beauti-
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ful city that it is today when I arrived in 1961, not the smoky and dirty place 
it was still reputed to be. Although Herbert Simon had turned his attention 
to the application of the computer to artiﬁcial intelligence by the time I had 
arrived in 1961, he still taught those of us in the Ph.D. program how to think 
about social phenomena and how to represent those thoughts in a math-
ematical model. We were also introduced to the wonders (and frustrations 
in these days of punch cards and slow turnaround) of the digital computer 
and taught how to apply it to real computational problems that arose in 
management using the recently developed methods of linear, non-linear, and 
dynamic programming. We were instructed in the new behavioral approach 
to the theory of organizations in general by Jim March and Herb Simon 
and the application of that theory to the analysis of the ﬁrm in particular by 
Richard Cyert and Jim March. Although these ideas interested me, eventually 
I turned to more traditional economics and began a thesis in growth theory 
directed by Michael Lovell, who by chance happened to be the son of my fa-
vorite history professor at Willamette. Along the way, I also found the love of 
my life, Beverly Patton. We were married in 1963 and soon became the proud 
parents of three children, Karl, Lia and Julie, between the time I started and 
completed my thesis.
Carnegie Tech was an amazing place at the time. New ideas of all kinds 
were in the air. They were not always consistent with each other, as in the case 
of the conﬂict between John Muth’s suggestion about how to model expecta-
tions as “rational” and Simon’s notion of “bounded rationality.” We students 
beneﬁted from the lively debates among the faculty. We were also encour-
aged by the faculty to get involved in the research process even before we 
had mastered the details of the literature. In my last two years, I took courses 
from Robert Lucas and Oliver Williamson with fellow student Ed Prescott, 
all of whom are now Laureates. In retrospect, it was obviously a very special 
educational experience.
I became a member of the faculty at Northwestern University in 1965 but 
did not complete my thesis until two years later at a graduate ceremony at 
which Carnegie Institute of Technology became Carnegie-Mellon University. 
At Northwestern I was mentored by the “three Bobs,” Robert Eisner, Robert 
Strotz and Robert Clower. In my ﬁrst couple of years, I ﬁnally learned the 
foundations of economic analysis by teaching Hicks and Samuelson to ﬁrst 
year Ph.D. students. Those ﬁrst three years were a struggle trying to develop 
teaching skills, ﬁnish a thesis that was taking too long, and helping care for 
three babies. Without the patience and perseverance of a loving wife, I would 
not have succeeded.
My interests in economics changed in this new environment. Two new and 
important colleagues arrived, Frank Brechling and Art Treadway. Frank’s 
research was focused on the dynamics of the labor market and Art, a student 
from the University of Chicago, was developing costs of adjustment models 
and applying them to investment theory. Together with colleague Bernt 
Stigum who was doing work on both time series analysis and dynamic general 
equilibrium, we taught ourselves dynamic control theory from the pages of 
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Pontriagin’s book. Finally, I was fully proﬁcient in control theory as well as 
dynamic programming, the tools that dominate macroeconomic theory to 
this day.
In the mid 1960s a debate raged over the Phillips curve and its implications for 
economic policy. Some interpreted the curve, a negative statistical association 
EHWZHHQWKHLQÀDWLRQUDWHDQGWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHDVDQXQSOHDVDQWWUDGHRII
that policy makers had to face. According to this view, one could use monetary 
policy to lower unemployment but only at the expense of a higher permanent rate of 
LQÀDWLRQ+RZHYHUWKHWKHRU\EHKLQGWKHFXUYHZDVVXVSHFW0LOWRQ)ULHGPDQLQKLV
1968 AEA Presidential Address declared that the economy tends toward a ‘natural’ 
rate of unemployment determined in market equilibrium which is invariant to the 
LQÀDWLRQUDWHDWOHDVWLQWKHORQJUXQ0RQHWDU\SROLF\FDQUHGXFHWKHXQHPSOR\-
ment rate over the relative short run by lowering real wages. However, any attempt 
to maintain the level below its natural or equilibrium rate though monetary policy 
ZLOOEHIUXVWUDWHGE\HYHULQFUHDVLQJLQÀDWLRQDVZRUNHUVDQGHPSOR\HUVUHDOL]H
what is happening.
Edmund Phelps (1968) argued along similar lines. Moreover, he complemented 
KLVDVVHUWLRQZLWKDQHZYLHZRIKRZWKHODERUPDUNHWZRUNV6SHFL¿FDOO\KH
suggested that some positive unemployment level was a natural outcome of the 
matching process in the labor market. Any attempt to lower unemployment below 
that determined by the rational agent behavior of individual employers and workers 
E\LQÀDWLQJWKHHFRQRP\ZRXOGVLPSO\LQGXFHDGMXVWPHQWEDFNWRLWVQDWXUDOOHYHO
DWDKLJKHUUDWHRILQÀDWLRQ8QGHUO\LQJWKHDUJXPHQWVRIERWK)ULHGPDQDQG3KHOSV
was the long standing proposition that there is no money illusion. Hence, only real 
ZDJHVPDWWHUDWOHDVWLQWKH³ORQJUXQ´$Q\DWWHPSWWRDUWL¿FLDOO\PDQLSXODWHWKH
price level through monetary policy would induce agents in the labor market to 
agree to offset the effect by revising the nominal wage.
At Northwestern we created an informal reading group focused on the macro 
economic implications of the new ideas about the labor market circulating in the 
profession. Included in the group were my colleagues Frank Brechling and Art 
Treadway as well as a visitor to the department, the British economist Chris 
Archibald. Both Frank and Chris had known Phillips at the London School of 
Economics, knew his work well, and had done research that was stimulated by it. 
With their help, I began to think about how to capture the essential features of a 
decentralized market with search friction in a formal but simple economic model. 
Using the labor market as my focus, I came up with the idea of modeling the con-
sequence of search and matching friction as the outcome of a sequence of random 
meetings between potentially interested parties.
After I had written a very long working paper designed to formulate and work 
out some of these ideas, Edmund Phelps came to Northwestern to give a seminar 
in the fall of 1968. During his stay, he informed me that he had read my paper 
with considerable interest. Furthermore, my ideas were closely related to those in 
a working paper of his co-authored with Sid Winter as well as several other work-
ing papers by others that tackled the issues that arose in decentralized exchange 
among rational agents that possessed only imperfect information about trading op-
portunities. He then revealed that he was planning a conference on the topic at the 
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University of Pennsylvania, his academic home at the time, in which these papers 
would be presented and discussed. I don’t recall whether he invited me to partici-
pate in the conference on the spot or whether that invitation came later. In any case, 
,ZDVIRUWXQDWHWRKDYHP\¿UVWPDMRUSDSHU³$7KHRU\RI:DJHDQG(PSOR\PHQW
Dynamics” published in the collection of papers presented at his conference that 
became universally known as the “Phelps volume” .
The Phelps volume published in 1970 bore a rather pretentious title: Micro-
HFRQRPLF)RXQGDWLRQVRI(PSOR\PHQWDQG,QÀDWLRQ7KHRU\ It became a classic 
anyway. The basic message of the collection was that one could and should 
FRQVLGHUWKHGXDOPDFURHFRQRPLFSUREOHPVRIHPSOR\PHQWDQGLQÀDWLRQDVWKH
outcomes of market behavior of individual agents who act in their own interests as 
best they can in a market environment characterized by uncertainties and incom-
plete information. As a corollary, the papers argued that macroeconomics should be 
founded on microeconomic principles. Included among the authors who published 
in the volume was Robert Lucas. Although the three of us, now all Nobel laureates, 
have not always agreed on the details and taken different direction in the pursuit of 
the goal, we have shared a common view that macroeconomics needs a foundation 
in equilibrium market analysis based on the principle that agents in such markets 
act in their own self interest. In the intervening forty years this view has come to 
dominate macro-economics.
My companion paper, “Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment and the 
Phillips Curve,” published in the American Economic Review in the same year, 
was an attempt to use my ideas about decentralized exchange in the labor market 
to provide an interpretation of the Phillips curve. I refer to it here, not because I 
accomplished that goal. In fact, I regard the paper as a failure in that dimension for 
several reasons. One of these was the inability to close the model with a convincing 
theory of agent expectations. Arguably this could have been done by invoking 
“rational expectations,” a concept that had already been introduced by one of my 
then Carnegie Tech professors, John Muth (1961). Unfortunately, I did not see its 
relevance for my work at the time even though I had participated in a seminar on 
WKHVXEMHFWEULHÀ\DVDVWXGHQW7KHLVVXHZDVVXEVHTXHQWO\UHVROYHGE\ODWHUDGRSW-
ing this approach in spite of its drawbacks.
The actual contribution of the AER paper, along with those of John McCall 
(1970), published at about the same time, was the formal model of sequential wage 
search that it embodied. In the model, an unemployed worker samples sequen-
tially from a known distribution of wage offers until one is found that exceeded an 
optimally chosen reservation wage. The optimal reservation wage is simply that 
which compensated the worker for forgoing the option of continuing to search for 
an even better wage. Although this formulation was simply an application of the 
well-known optimal stopping problem in statistical decision theory, it was a new 
dynamic approach to the understanding of unemployment that incorporated the 
need of workers to gather information. Since this need suggested that the time spent 
searching was productive, the model offered an entirely new view of unemploy-
ment.
At the time, Keynesian thought dominated the profession’s view of unem-
ployment. Viewed though the lens of classical supply and demand analysis, 
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Keynesians argued that unemployment arose because the real wage was 
too high. Unemployment in this view was totally involuntary; unemployed 
workers were simply those that could not ﬁnd a job at the prevailing wage. 
The idea that workers might rationally choose to be unemployed was beyond 
their imagination. Indeed, when I presented a working paper version of what 
became my AER article at the annual meeting of the American Economic 
Association, some who attended walked out in protest. Nevertheless, my 
colleagues at Northwestern chose to promote me to Associate Professor with 
tenure in the fall of 1970 with only two forthcoming papers to my credit.
My family and I spent the academic year 1970–71 on sabbatical visiting 
at the University of Essex in England with my colleague Frank Brechling. 
At the time Frank and I were working together on a project designed to 
formulate and estimate a model of employment dynamics based on the idea 
that the process of recruiting and hiring workers was a time and resource 
consuming process. As part of that project, I wrote a draft of my theory paper 
“Generalized Costs of Adjustment and Dynamic Factor Demand Theory” 
(Mortensen, 1973) which provided a mathematical foundation for investment 
in an arbitrary number of capital goods couched in terms of mathematical 
control theory. 
Several of the Essex faculty had visited Northwestern previously, so we had 
a congenial group of colleagues that also included John Kennan, a Ph.D. stu-
dent at the time, who served as our research assistant. Christopher Pissarides 
was a student at Essex ﬁnishing his undergraduate course that year. He tells 
me we discussed his plan to pursue search theory as a graduate student at the 
London School of Economics although I don’t recall the meeting. During 
the year I was invited to Oxford, London School of Economics, and Durham 
University to present my current work on search in the labor market. These 
were opportunities to meet English economists, opportunities that were rare 
in the expensive early days of the jet age.
The 1970s was the decade of developments in the new area of information 
economics. Search theory, which emphasized the need to gather informa-
tion, was joined by models that featured asymmetric information, the case 
in which information differed across individual agents. Signaling, screening, 
moral hazard and adverse selection, terms never mentioned when I was 
a graduate student, became the new vocabulary of the analysis of market 
performance during these years. Search theory, particularly as it related to 
the phenomena of unemployment, continues to develop as well.
The debate over whether unemployment was “voluntary” or “involuntary,” 
“natural” or not, reﬂected “disequilibrium” or was an “equilibrium” phe- 
nomenon continued. Although thankfully this vocabulary has disap-
peared for the most part, the basic  issue has not. Are workers unem-
ployed because the real wage fails to clear the labor market or does 
unemployment reﬂect the trade-off between the value of time spent   
searching and its value in production given the search frictions identiﬁed in 
the new approach to unemployment and inﬂation expressed in the Phelps 
volume? James Tobin (1972) in his AEA presidential address, “Inﬂation and 
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Unemployment,” was perhaps the ﬁrst to ask the question in precisely this 
form.
Tobin was particularly critical of the prevailing job search model which 
assumed, as many still do, that only unemployed workers search and that 
workers might quit to unemployment in order to ﬁnd better jobs. He cited 
sketchy evidence for the hypothesis that large numbers of workers move 
from one job to another without an intervening period of unemployment, 
a hypothesis which has since been veriﬁed. We now know that about half 
of hires in the U.S. and an even larger fraction in other countries consist 
of workers who already have jobs. To the extent that search-on-the job was 
feasible, productive search unemployment as an alternative explanation for 
unemployment was questionable.
Stimulated by Tobin’s critique, my student Ken Burdett developed the ﬁrst 
formal model of search on-the-job in his Ph.D. thesis, which was published 
as Burdett (1978). Although the analysis clearly illustrated the fact that the 
worker criteria for an acceptable job are less stringent when there when the 
option to search while employed is available, the idea that the unemployed 
were engaged in job search, as standard measures require, was fully captured 
by the theory. Of course, this fact did not rule out the possibility that the 
real wage may be too high as well, a point, which seemed to escape some 
Keynsian critics of the new theory.
Challenges to the idea that workers search because wages differ across 
employment opportunities came from the other contributors to the theory. 
Peter Diamond (1971), in his attempt to understand how prices might be set 
in a world of search friction, found that wage-setting employers would offer 
a single wage when workers located employment opportunities sequentially. 
Surprisingly, that wage was the monopsony wage, one which lies below the 
value of a worker’s marginal product. This result led Rothschild (1973) to 
ask, “What is the source of wage dispersion that is supposed to motivate 
search unemployment?” Later Burdett and Judd (1983) answered the   
question with a paper that provided that foundation for the modern theory 
of wage dispersion.
Partly in response to these developments, the theory of unemployment 
shifted its emphasis from the problem of a worker seeking a high paying 
job to the formation of good job-worker matches. The matching problem, 
whether found in the labor, housing, or the marriage market, is one of   
forming complementary pairs in a world in which individual workers and 
jobs are heterogenous. It takes time and resources to accomplish this task, 
and the duration of unemployment experienced by individual workers 
as well as the length of time that an existing job is vacant reﬂect this fact. 
Empirical labor economists found this idea persuasive and used the models 
developed  in the 70s, such as that presented in Mortensen (1976) and 
Burdett and Mortensen (1978) together with the statistical tools of duration 
analysis to interpret both unemployment and job spell data.
In 1980, Ken Burdett and I taught an intensive two-week short course 
on search and matching theory in Oslo. Our students were young Ph.D.   
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candidates from all of the Scandinavian countries. At the time, Ken and I 
together with George Neumann and Nicholas Kiefer were estimating three 
state models of worker ﬂows using longitudinal panel date generated as part 
of the Seattle/Denver income maintenance experiment (Burdett et al, 1984). 
One of our students, Lars Muus, informed us that a group of economists 
at Aarhus University were creating employment and earning history spell 
data from Danish administrative records. These data had the advantage that 
they were collected continuously, covered the entire population, and could 
be linked to detailed information about each individual’s education, age, and 
family demographics. In August 1982 all four of us were invited to attend the 
ﬁrst conference featuring these data held at Sandbjerg Manor, a convention 
center in the south of Jutland, owned by Aarhus University and built around 
an 18th century manor house. My visit to Denmark with my wife and father, 
who had been born in Jutland and emigrated to the U.S. at age 10, initiated 
a fruitful association with Aarhus University as well as a rewarding interaction 
with my Danish cousins.
In the early 80s, Peter Diamond (1982a, 1982b) and I (1982a, 1982b) were 
both creating models of two sided search and matching equilibrium. These 
papers incorporated the concept of a matching function and assumed that 
wages were determined through bilateral bargaining. They were two sided in 
the sense that agents on both sides of the market made search investments in 
the process of creating a match.
The matching function is a postulated relationship between search and 
recruiting effort and the aggregate rate at which workers and job meet. 
Once a particular pair meets and ﬁnds that the match offered a surplus 
relative to continued search by both, it is formed. The division of the surplus, 
which determined the expected future wages and proﬁts that employer and 
employee enjoy once matched, is regarded as the outcome of a bilateral 
bargain. Shortly after the appearance of these papers, Christopher Pissarides 
(1985) completed what became known at the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides 
or DMP model of the labor market by adding a job creation condition which   
determines the number of vacant jobs as that which equates the cost of creating 
a job to the expected present value of proﬁt from an acceptable match.
The DMP model is an equilibrium theory of unemployment determina-
tion. It has important implications for unemployment dynamics and for the 
effects of government policies on labor market outcomes. For example, the 
model implies that procyclical movements in vacancies will induce counter-
cyclical movements in unemployment as Beveridge (1944) documented for 
the U.K. in the early 20th century and has been established for every other 
developed economy with data on job openings. However, it also provides 
insights into the effects of unemployment insurance and taxes as well as 
active labor market policies. As more generous unemployment insurance 
adds to the option value of continued search as an unemployed worker, one 
expects higher wages and longer unemployment spells in countries with high 
beneﬁts and long unemployment beneﬁt periods. The theory also implies 
that job search training will lower the time required to ﬁnd acceptable 
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employment. Generally empirical studies have conﬁrmed these predictions 
as well as the existence of a relatively stable matching function.
In the original version of the DMP model, job separations were regarded 
as exogenous. The research of Davis and Haltiwanger demonstrated that   
layoffs were an important determinant of movements in unemployment 
(Davis  et al., 1998). In a review of the ﬁrst edition of Pissarides’ book, 
Equilibrium Unemployment, published in 1990, I suggested that this fact 
should be incorporated into the model. Later, Chris and I collaborated on 
the task in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Chris incorporated the 
extended model into the second edition of his book in 2000.
The extended version of the DMP model supposes that the productivity 
of a job is subject to an idiosyncratic shock process as well as an aggregate 
shock. In this setting, a job is destroyed when its productivity falls below the 
value to both the employer and employee of seeking an alternative match. 
This formulation explained the basic asymmetry which characterized the 
typical effects of a business cycle. Namely, layoffs which occur early in the 
downturn are typically large and take place over a relatively short period 
of time, while recovery in employment once started is spread over a much 
longer period of time.
In a subsequent series of co-authored papers, Chris and I also investigated 
the implications of the model for a wide variety of government policies in-
cluding employment protection. We found that our model did a good job 
of capturing the principal effects of ﬁring restrictions, a reduction in both 
the typical ﬂow of workers from employment to unemployment and from 
unemployment to employment, that characterize economies with strong 
employment protection. According to the model, economies with labor 
market inﬂexibilities of this kind have problems adjusting to the changes in 
technology experienced in the last thirty years. This argument has induced 
reforms in a number of countries, which take the form of allowing ﬁxed 
contracts with no layoff penalty. Most of these ﬁndings are summarized in 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998a, 1998b).
In another line of research, Ken Burdett and I pursued the implications 
of Diamond’s original model of dynamic monopoly in the late 80s and 90s. 
As noted earlier, Diamond’s analysis when applied in a labor market context 
implied that wages are set so that employers capture the entire surplus of a 
match if employers have the power to set the wages of their employees and 
workers search for jobs sequentially. Although the assumption that employers 
can post wages seemed consistent with how wages are determined in many 
labor markets, Diamond’s conclusion that all employers set the same wage in 
an environment where many employers compete seemed inconsistent with 
empirical observation.
Ken Burdett, together with his then student Ken Judd, generalized the 
Diamond result by showing that equilibria exist characterized by price 
dispersion, different prices offered for the same good, if some buyers have 
the option of choosing between two offers while others must accept or reject 
offers sequentially. Shortly after the publication of their paper, Burdett and 
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Judd (1983), Burdett invited me to spend a quarter visiting at Cornell, his 
employer at the time. One day, I pointed out to Ken that conditions that he 
and Judd had derived for the existence of price dispersion were automati-
cally satisﬁed in a labor market model in which unemployed workers search 
sequentially but employed workers also search and can choose between 
continued employment and any alternative wage offer generated. In 1990, 
we both published papers that worked out implications of this  idea and 
submitted a jointly authored paper that provided the basic logic of our 
model to a number of top rated journals. Apparently referees and editors 
were not ready for our idea. After a series of rejections, each following a 
long review period, our paper entitled “Wage Differentials, Employer Size   
and Unemployment” ﬁnally appeared in the International Economic Review in 
1998. By this publication date, the paper was already well known and had 
become the theoretical foundation for a new empirical literature on wage 
dispersion, which I reviewed in my Zeuthen lectures published in 2003 under 
the title “Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Worker Paid Differently?” The 
paper remains the classic reference in the new labor literature on monop-
sony. (See Ashenfelter et al., 2010 for a review of recent work.) 
I was again attracted in 1998 to Aarhus, where I spent 6 months at the 
Center for Labor Studies associated with Aarhus University learning about a 
new data source. My friends and colleagues there had integrated their longi-
tudinal data on individual labor market histories with data that included ﬁrm 
identiﬁers and some information about ﬁrm characteristics. Later these data 
were augmented with accounting information from income statements and 
balance sheets. Along with the well-known French data set, it has become a 
major source of information about job-worker matches. Although there is 
now a similar U.S. data set created by combining business census data on 
ﬁrms with employment spell histories of worker qualiﬁed for unemploy-
ment insurance, the Danish data dominate the other two in the sense that it 
includes more detailed information about individual workers.
Detailed longitudinal data about ﬁrms had recently been exploited for 
labor market studies by Davis and Haltiwanger for their purpose of creating 
so-called job-creation and job-destruction time series, work, which  is   
summarized  in their book with Scott Schuh, Job Creation and Destruction, 
published  in 1998. Their evidence clearly reﬂected the heterogeneity of   
ﬁrm growth rates in employment at the ﬁrm level. Subsequent research 
based on these data illustrated several interesting patterns relating   
ﬁrm employment, wages, and productivity. Namely, larger ﬁrms pay more 
and are more productive. Trade theorists added the fact those ﬁrms that 
engage in international trade are larger, more productive, and pay wage 
premiums. To my colleagues and me in both Denmark and the U.S., these 
facts suggested that workers and other resources should be moving from 
smaller less productive and lower paying ﬁrms to larger more productive ﬁrm   
and that this reallocation process might be an important source of economic 
growth as well as an explanation for why wages differed so much across   
ﬁrms.
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In Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Rasmus Lentz and I developed and 
estimated a model in which productivity differences are the outcome of 
differences in the ability of ﬁrms to develop new products. These differences 
induce differential ﬁrm growth, which can explain the positive association 
found between ﬁrm productivity, average wage paid, and size in the data. 
Furthermore, an empirical version of the model estimated using the Danish 
data implies that over 50 percent of the growth rate in the value of goods 
and services of the private sector over the sample period studied can be   
attributed to this reallocation process. In our original model, the friction 
that sustains differences in productivity is a combination of the fact that 
every product is eventually displaced and that growth is costly. Although we 
abstracted from search and matching friction we are now working on estimat-
ing a model which also includes this possibility.
Obviously, the focus of this narrative is on my research and the develop-
ment of some of its principal themes over the years. At the same time I was 
leading a life that was enriched by teaching and family relationships. I taught 
both undergraduates and graduate students while still at Carnegie Tech in 
the early 1960s. Although most of my teaching took place at Northwestern 
University, my home base since leaving graduate school in 1965, I have 
also taught at Essex University, Cornell University, the California Institute 
of Technology, New York University, and more recently at Aarhus University 
during visits of various length. Indeed, during the last ﬁve years I have 
split my academic year equally between Northwestern University as the Ida 
C. Cook Professor of Economics and Aarhus University as the Niels Bohr 
Visiting Professor of Economics.
With undergraduate class sizes that varied from 30 to 300, simple calcula-
tions suggest that there was a large number of students that listened to my 
voice if not to my wisdom. I have been fortunate to have excellent students 
and I hope that my inﬂuence on them has been for the good. Some of my 
most satisfying undergraduate teaching was in the program of Mathematical 
Methods for Social Sciences, an honors curriculum at Northwestern de-
signed to train undergraduates in the analytic techniques and models in the 
social sciences that are usually taught only to graduate students. I also had 
the privilege of directing that program at two different intervals of time. 
The program continues to thrive as one of the most popular available at 
Northwestern.
My many Ph.D. students have been at least as important in disseminating 
my research ideas and results as my published papers. Many of them are   
professors themselves, some at top universities, but a number are also 
contributing their skill within the Federal Reserve Bank system and agencies 
of the federal government such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These   
individuals are not only former students but continue to be supportive 
friends that I value highly, along with colleagues at both Northwestern and 
Aarhus, as members of my close academic family. F inally, the continued   
support for my work by Northwestern University must be acknowledged. 
During my 45 years in the institution it has progressed from what was a 
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party school that catered to the children of the upper income professional 
classes of middle America to a ﬁrst rate international center of learning and   
research. Although I may be the ﬁrst Economics Prize Laureate on the 
faculty, I expect fellow company soon.
Let me ﬁnish with a brief tribute to my life partner. ‘Behind every great 
man is a great women’ is an old cliché that ﬁts my case well, as any of our 
friends and colleagues will attest. As I mentioned in the beginning, Beverly 
and I started our lives together while I was still a student at Carnegie in 1963. 
Four years later, we had three children and my Ph.D. degree. That period 
established the relationship.
But as an undergraduate, Beverly trained as a musician and teacher, a   
profession that she practiced for the ﬁrst year of our marriage. After ﬁve 
years of diapers, she ventured out into the world as a guitar player and folk 
singer. Later she directed the choir for 25 years at our local Catholic church 
and composed numerous hymns, psalms, and two oratorios for her favorite 
instrument, the choir. She then used her composing talents to collaborate 
with others in the writing several original musicals, all of which were per-
formed by either high school or community groups. She also conducted a 
community chorus for many years that performed both pop music concerts 
and madrigal extravaganzas. F inally, as the three children were ﬁnishing 
their college studies, Beverly returned to school herself to complete a Ph.D. 
in Religious Studies. Since 1994 she has taught at Northwestern and was 
named last year by her students to the faculty honor roll. During these same 
years, she and I have managed to raise three children who have now pro-
vided us with eight grandchildren. The cousins, who range in age from 9 to 
17, form a cohesive group that has enhanced the lives of their elders without 
measure. We see in them a bright future for our family.
During all this activity over these many years Beverly has been and contin-
ues to be my strongest supporter and best friend. My colleagues have long 
noted that my research on search and matching deals with the formation and 
dissolution of relationships. How is it, they ask, that you have been had the 
same job for 45 years and the same wife for 47? My response is simple: Both 
are excellent matches!
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